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a b s t r a c t
Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002 to improve the accuracy and
reliability of ﬁnancial reporting. The Act increased boards of directors’ responsibilities for
ﬁnancial reporting and control. Did it consequently increase boards’ preferences for a
CEO with ﬁnancial experience to protect against the potential reputational and/or legal
losses that directors incur when ﬁnancial scandals happen? We investigated whether
newly appointed CEOs in the post-SOX period were more likely to have accounting or
ﬁnance experience than in the pre-SOX period. Using a sample of 264 CEO changes from
2001 to 2004, we found that the percentage of newly-appointed CEOs with accounting/
ﬁnance backgrounds signiﬁcantly increased in the post-SOX period compared to the preSOX period. Our results suggest that the events surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act may have affected the CEO background experience preferred by boards
of directors.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 was passed in the
wake of a number of high proﬁle corporate accounting
scandals to ‘‘improv[e] the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures . . . ’’ SOX includes several provisions
clarifying and extending the board’s responsibilities for
ﬁnancial reporting and control issues. Boards of directors
are required to establish audit committees, and the act creates a presumption that there will be a ﬁnancial expert on
the audit committee. The act also makes SEC sanctions
against directors and management more likely by lowering
the bar for actionable director misconduct. As a result
of the ﬁnancial scandals precipitating the passage of
SOX, the ﬁnancial press questioned the adequacy of board
oversight of executive’s ﬁnancial reporting. For example,

⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 401 232 6421.
E-mail addresses: cullinan@bryant.edu (C.P. Cullinan), proush@bus.
ucf.edu (P.B. Roush).
1
Tel.: +1 407 823 5664.
1052-0457/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.racreg.2011.03.005

Hu (2006) indicates that if directors had hired executives
with more accounting/ﬁnance knowledge, some of the
high proﬁle frauds occurring during the pre-SOX period
may have been avoided.
This paper adds to the literature on the changes that
may have been effected by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act2 by
assessing whether the provisions of SOX (and the ﬁnancial
misstatements occurring at the same time) may have affected CEO appointments.3 Speciﬁcally, we investigate
whether newly-appointed CEOs were more likely to have
accounting/ﬁnancial experience in the post-SOX era relative
2
For example, Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Sohail (2006) found that
information security disclosures were signiﬁcantly different in the postSOX period compared to the pre-Sox period. Similarly, McEnroe (2007)
found that SOX has a small perceived effect on the likelihood of earnings
management.
3
Because the passage of SOX and ﬁnancial misstatement disclosure
occurred at about the same time, we cannot determine whether it was the
passage of the SOX or the ﬁnancial scandals that may have changed
executive hiring decisions, or some combination of the two issues. As such,
when we refer to the post-SOX era, we do not imply that the passage of the
SOX was the only issue that may have changed behavior.
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to the pre-SOX era. The negative perceptions of the board’s
monitoring responsibility for executive qualiﬁcations in
highly publicized frauds may have inﬂuenced directors to
place more emphasis on the accounting/ﬁnancial background of CEO candidates in the post-SOX corporate
environment.4
We examined 264 CEO appointments in publicly-traded
ﬁrms occurring from 2001 to 2004. We found that 15.48%
of the CEOs appointed in the pre-SOX period had accounting and/or ﬁnance experience, while 33.33% of CEOs appointed post-SOX had this experience. To test the
persistence of these results, we compared six-month time
periods before and after the act. Results show a spike in
CEO appointments with an accounting/ﬁnance background
in the six month period immediately following the passage
of the SOX, and that the percentage of newly-appointed
CEOs with accounting/ﬁnance experience was higher in
each of the six-month periods post-SOX than they were
in any of the pre-SOX periods. We also tested a multivariate model to assess the SOX main effect on CEO accounting/ﬁnancial experience by including control variables
that may explain ﬁrm preference for a CEO with an
accounting/ﬁnance background. The multivariate model
supports the idea that ﬁrms were signiﬁcantly more likely
to appoint a CEO with an accounting/ﬁnance background
in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
the next section, we review the board and executive
responsibility provisions of SOX and the ‘‘lack of knowledge of accounting’’ defense used by executives accused
of ﬁnancial manipulation. We also discuss the limited research on the effects of CEO background, followed by
development of the research question examined in the
study. We then discuss the research methods used and
the results, followed by a presentation of the limitations
of our research. We conclude with a summary and implications of our ﬁndings.
Literature review
Board and CEO responsibilities for ﬁnancial reporting and
control
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act, passed by the US Congress and
signed by the President on July 30, 2002, increased director’s responsibility for ﬁnancial reports. For example, SOX
requires boards to establish audit committees, which have
the responsibility to provide oversight of the ﬁnancial
reporting process (§ 301). The Act also imposes a higher
standard of care on directors and lowers the bar for the
SEC to pursue directors for unﬁtness (§ 305).5 SOX also creates a presumption that boards will have a ﬁnancial expert
4
For example, Chandar, Klein, and Zheng (2010) examined the effects of
the Enron ﬁnancial scandal on the directors of Enron. They found that in
2000, before the ﬁnancial scandal, the 16 directors of Enron had an average
of 2.7 total directorships each. In 2003, after the Enron ﬁnancial scandal, 15
of the 16 directors had no directorships at all. The 1 remaining director
went from having 5 directorships to only 2.
5
Speciﬁcally, the act lowers the standard for SEC action against directors
and management from ‘‘substantial unﬁtness’’ to simply ‘‘unﬁtness’’ (SOX §
305).

on their audit committee by requiring the disclosure of a
ﬁnancial expert, or the reasons why the audit committee
does not have a ﬁnancial expert (§ 407). These director provisions of SOX could lead to further reputational and/or legal
consequences for directors in ﬁrms that experience ﬁnancial
scandals. Directors could be expected to place greater reliance on managers’ accounting and ﬁnancial experience to
avoid these ﬁnancial scandals, and the resulting director
reputational and/or legal complications.
Upper management’s responsibilities for ﬁnancial
reporting and control issues were also increased by SOX.
The Act requires CEOs to certify that the ﬁnancial statements fairly present ﬁnancial results (§ 302), and imposes
ﬁnes of up to $5,000,000 and prison terms of up to 20 years
for corporate ofﬁcers who falsely certify ﬁnancial results (§
906). In addition, executives of publicly-traded ﬁrms are
required to acknowledge their responsibility for, and report on the effectiveness of, their internal control system
(§ 404). Senior management must also disclose to the auditor and audit committee any fraud (even if immaterial)
involving management or others involved in control
functions.

The ‘‘lack of accounting knowledge’’ defense
In the 2006 trial in which he was accused of involvement in a material misstatement of Cendant’s ﬁnancial
statements, Walter Forbes, former CEO of Cendant, claimed
that he was not responsible for the ﬁnancial manipulation
because he knew ‘‘little of accounting and never paid any
attention to how the proﬁt ﬁgures were compiled’’ (Norris,
2006, p. C6). Due to a mistrial, Mr. Forbes avoided conviction.6 In 2001, Enron management was accused of ﬁnancial
statement manipulation. Subsequently, Jeffrey Skilling, former CEO of Enron, testiﬁed before the US Senate that he
‘‘was not an accountant’’ (Norris, 2005) and could therefore
not be expected to understand or be responsible for any
ﬁnancial statement problems at Enron. In both of these
cases, the executives asserted their innocence due to their
‘‘lack of accounting knowledge.’’7
Although management has always been responsible for
ﬁnancial reporting and internal controls, these responsibilities were clariﬁed in SOX, and more severe sanctions were
implemented. Norris (2005) asserts that the US Congress
included the CEO provisions in SOX because of Jeffrey Skilling’s (the former Enron CEO) use of the ‘‘lack of accounting
knowledge’’ defense in his congressional testimony. Asare,
Cunningham, and Wright (2007) discuss the SOX provisions regarding executive responsibility for ﬁnancial
reporting. With regard to the lack of knowledge defense,
they indicate that: ‘‘[t]he chief practical goals and effect
of [SOX] Section 906 is to diminish the ignorance
defense . . . Similarly, [SOX] Section 302 afﬁrmations limit
6
The jury could not reach consensus on Mr. Forbes’ guilt, so a mistrial
was declared.
7
In the subsequent trial of former Enron CEOs Jeffrey Skilling and
Kenneth Lay, the jury convicted both men on numerous federal fraud and
conspiracy charges. A juror stated that she ‘‘hoped executives at other
companies would realize that those in charge have responsibility’’ (Emshwiller, McWilliams, & Davis, 2006).
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ofﬁcer’s ability to hide behind the defense of ignorance.’’
(Asare et al., 2007, p. 93). Did the CEOs’ explicit statutory
responsibilities encourage corporate boards to seek out
CEOs with ﬁnancial experience?8
Effects of CEO accounting/ﬁnancial experience
There is some research that examines the effects on
ﬁrms of CEOs with an accounting/ﬁnance background. Barker and Mueller (2002) examined research and development (R&D) spending and found that ﬁrms whose CEOs
have an accounting/ﬁnance background did not spend signiﬁcantly different amounts on R&D than other ﬁrms. Mizruchi and Stearns (2002) found that in the 1970 and early
1980s, ﬁrms’ debt levels were more inﬂuenced by whether
the ﬁrm’s CEO had an accounting/ﬁnance background, and
less inﬂuenced by the ﬁrms’ industry characteristics. For
more recent time periods, they found that industry characteristics, rather than the CEO’s background, had greater
explanatory power in their model of debt levels.
Matsunaga and Yeung (2008) examined the outcomes
of appointing a CEO with ﬁnancial/accounting experience
(as measured by whether the CEO has previously served
as a CFO). They found that ﬁrms managed by CEOs who
had formerly been CFOs exhibited more conservative
accruals than other ﬁrms. They also found that ﬁrms managed by CEOs with CFO experience had more accurate and
less volatile analyst’s earnings expectations. They conclude
that ‘‘the quality of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial disclosures is a function of the CEO’s ﬁnancial experience’’ (p. 1).
Research question
Directors, whose reputations and/or legal liability could
be adversely affected by a ﬁnancial scandal (e.g., SOX §
301, 305 and 407) wish to avoid situations in which the
CEOs of companies that they oversee are not able to effectively carry out their ﬁnancial reporting responsibility, and
also probably wish to avoid CEOs who could claim ignorance of ﬁnancial rules. These directors may also prefer
the higher quality ﬁnancial disclosures which Matsunaga
and Yeung (2008) found to be associated with CEOs having
accounting/ﬁnancial experience. Directors could reduce
the probability of reputational and/or legal losses associated with ﬁnancial reporting problems by selecting CEOs
with accounting/ﬁnancial experience.
Hu (2006) directly discusses the relationship between
accounting knowledge and the importance of director
oversight of executives at Enron, and asserts that:
‘‘A board vigorously monitoring Mr. Lay’s performance
would surely have concluded that anyone who didn’t
understand these [suspect ﬁnancial arrangements] wasn’t
qualiﬁed for the job (much less worth millions of dollars
in compensation).’’
‘‘Just think how much fraud might have been deterred if
a board had replaced Mr. Lay with someone more qualiﬁed’’ (Hu, 2006, p. A27).
8
Alternatively, the legal liability provisions of the SOX may have
restricted the applicant pool of people who are willing to assume the
responsibilities of CEO.
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SOX makes a number of explicit statements about
boards of directors’ responsibilities for ﬁnancial reporting
and control, and was enacted when some large ﬁnancial
misstatements were being disclosed. Given the accounting
frauds which brought about the act, and Matsunaga and
Yeung’s (2008) ﬁnding that accounting/ﬁnance-experienced CEOs use more conservative accounting, boards
may perceive greater beneﬁts to hiring a CEO with
accounting/ﬁnance knowledge in the post-SOX period
(Hu, 2006).9 In this study, we seek to determine whether
boards of directors place greater emphasis on accounting/ﬁnance knowledge when choosing CEOs in the post-SOX era
than they did in the pre-SOX era. Speciﬁcally, we examine
the following research question:
RQ: Are CEOs appointed after enactment of Sarbanes–
Oxley more likely to have accounting/ﬁnance experience than those appointed before SOX?

Research method
Identiﬁcation of CEO changes and the main variable of interest
We used the website ‘‘ceogo.com’’ to identify Fortune
500 CEO replacements made from 2001 to 2004. Biographical information on the new CEOs was obtained from ‘‘ceogo.com’’ and Who’s Who in Finance and Industry. We
obtained adequate information to examine CEO changes
for an 18 month period prior to the adoption of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and for a 30 month post-Sarbanes–Oxley
period.10 The main variable of interest is whether the
change occurred in the pre- or post-Sarbanes–Oxley period.
Measuring accounting/ﬁnance experience
Gore, Matsunaga, and Yeung (2004) deemed ‘‘ﬁnancial
experience’’ of CEOs to exist if the executive had a CPA designation; had worked as a CFO, controller, treasurer, etc.;
had a degree in accounting or ﬁnance; or had worked for
a ﬁnancial services ﬁrm (e.g., banking, insurance).11 For
our study, we largely follow the Gore deﬁnition with one
exception. Because we are interested in whether CEOs had
the requisite background to assess fair presentation and
internal control adequacy, we did not feel that experience
9
Complementarily, potential candidates for CEO positions without an
accounting/ﬁnance background may be less willing to assume the incremental legal liability exposure created by SOX’s certiﬁcation provisions.
10
The site began providing CEO biographies in 2001. As such, we were
unable to extend our sample period to more than 18 months prior to the
passage of Sarbanes–Oxley.
11
There is a difference between ﬁnancial ‘‘experience’’ as used in the
current study (which is also used by Gore et al. (2004) and DeFond, Hann,
and Hu (2005)) and ﬁnancial ‘‘expertise’’ as used by SOX § 407 regarding
audit committees. In particular, the Securities Exchange Commission
(2003) broadly deﬁnes ﬁnancial expertise (of audit committee members)
to include anyone (including a CEO) who has overseen top ﬁnancial
executives. Such a deﬁnition would be too broad to assess the importance
of ﬁnancial experience of potential CEOs. In addition, if we were to use the
SEC’s deﬁnition, every one of the CEOs in our sample could be said to have
ﬁnancial expertise because they are CEOs. DeFond et al. (2005), in their
study of audit committee members also emphasize the distinction between
ﬁnancial ‘‘experience’’ and ﬁnancial ‘‘expertise.’’
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working in a ﬁnancial services ﬁrm in a non-ﬁnancial position (e.g., in a marketing capacity) would qualify as accounting/ﬁnance experience.12 Thus, in our study, the CEO is
considered to have ﬁnancial expertise if he/she had one or
more of the following background characteristics13:
a. Experience in an accounting or auditing position.
b. Experience in a ﬁnancial management position, such
as CFO or treasurer.
c. A degree (either undergraduate or graduate) in
accounting or ﬁnance.
d. CPA certiﬁcation.
Control variables
We control for ﬁrm characteristics that may explain why
ﬁrms would select CEOs with accounting/ﬁnancial experience. The only study we identiﬁed that developed a model
of characteristics associated with ﬁnancial experienced
CEOs was Guthrie and Datta (1997), who examined the differing characteristics of ﬁrms hiring CEOs with ‘‘output’’ vs.
‘‘throughput’’ functional experience. ‘‘Output’’ experience
was deﬁned to include ‘‘marketing, sales, merchandising,
[and] product R & D’’14 (p. 548), while ‘‘throughput’’ experience included ‘‘production, process R & D, and ﬁnance/
accounting’’ (p. 548). Notice that our measure of accounting/ﬁnance experience is narrower than Guthrie and Datta’s
(1997) deﬁnition of ‘‘throughput’’ experience.
Consistent with Guthrie and Datta (1997), we included
ﬁrm size as a control variable measured as total assets. Previous literature provides no clear guidance as to whether
larger or smaller ﬁrms may prefer certain types of executives. Retail ﬁrms are more likely to seek a CEO with a marketing/sales background (Cullinan, 2008) and therefore
may be less likely to choose a CEO with accounting/ﬁnance
experience; we included a variable measuring whether the
ﬁrm was in a retail business. We included the ﬁrm’s gross
proﬁt margin to measure whether the ﬁrm follows a differentiation strategy (suggested by a higher proﬁt margin) or
a cost-leadership strategy (evidenced by a lower proﬁt
margin). Firms following a cost leadership strategy may
have a greater emphasis on cost control, and therefore
might favor CEOs with accounting/ﬁnancial experience.
The percentage of a ﬁrm’s assets in property, plant and
equipment (PPE) was included to control for the relative asset intensity of the ﬁrm. Firms with greater asset intensity
may be more likely to choose a CEO with accounting/ﬁnance experience because these companies require an
executive more experienced in managing resources, rather
than managing people. We also included measures of ﬁnancial stress the ﬁrm may be experiencing at the time of the
CEO change, with the expectation that higher level of ﬁnancial stress may lead boards to prefer CEOs with accounting/
ﬁnancial experience. Our measures of ﬁnancial stress are
12

Inclusion of CEOs with a non-accounting/ﬁnance background who
worked in ﬁnancial service ﬁrms did not materially alter the results.
13
This coding scheme is also materially consistent with DeFond et al.
(2005).
14
Cullinan (2008) provided a more speciﬁc model of the types of ﬁrms
that are likely to select a CEO with marketing experience.

ﬁnancial leverage (debt to invested capital) to measure
whether the ﬁrm relies more heavily on debt than equity,
and cash balances and cash ﬂows (both scaled by ﬁrm size).
We included a variable measuring whether the ﬁrms
pays a dividend. These ﬁrms may prefer CEOs with more
accounting/ﬁnance experience to manage the ﬁnancial resources necessary to ensure a continuing dividend stream.
We also measure whether the ﬁrm has foreign operations,
as these ﬁrms may emphasize international experience,
rather than accounting experience in choosing CEOs. We
also included industry dummy variables in our model.15
In a second model, we also included a variable measuring whether the former CEO had an accounting/ﬁnance
background to reﬂect the longer-term characteristics of
ﬁrms that may cause the ﬁrm to favor a CEO with an
accounting/ﬁnance background. This variable controls for
the possibility that these ﬁrms may simply have replaced
former CEOs with accounting/ﬁnance experience with a
new CEO that also has accounting/ﬁnance experience.
While such changes may have occurred around the SOX
adoption, we felt they would not likely be related to events
occurring at the time of the passage of SOX.

Data collection and analysis
Data collection
The ﬁnal sample of CEO changes drawn from the ‘‘ceogo.com’’ website consisted of 244 changes from 2001 to
2004. To analyze whether the accounting/ﬁnancial experience of individuals chosen to be CEOs changed in the postSarbanes–Oxley period, we computed the percentage of
newly-appointed CEOs with accounting/ﬁnancial experience in the pre- and post-Sarbanes–Oxley periods. We next
present a logistic regression model (Model 1) including the
post-SOX variable and the control variables to examine the
effect of SOX on the likelihood of appointing a CEO with an
accounting/ﬁnancial background. We also present another
logistic regression model (Model 2), which incorporate all
of the control variables, plus whether the former CEO
had accounting/ﬁnancial experience.

Results and limitations
Results
The percentage of ﬁrms hiring CEOs with accounting/
ﬁnancial experience in the pre- and post-SOX periods is
presented in Panel A of Table 1. In the pre-SOX period
15.48% of newly-appointed CEOs had accounting/ﬁnancial
experience. In the post-SOX period this percentage increased to 33.33%. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant. These results suggest that events associated with
15
In unreported analyses, we also included as control variables the ﬁrm’s
age at the time of CEO change, the ﬁrm’s stock’s beta, and the ﬁrm’s 3 year
sales growth. None of these variables were signiﬁcant, and none of these
variables had a material effect on the other control variables or on the prepost Sarbanes variable of interest. Because of missing data for some of these
additional control variables, which would have resulted in a material
decrease in sample size, we chose to present a more parsimonious model.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and bivariate results.
Panel A: Sarbanes–Oxley Act variable

Pre-Sarbanes–Oxley Act
Post Sarbanes–Oxley Act
t Value
p>t

% of CEO appointments where CEO has an accounting or ﬁnance background

Sample size

15.48%
33.33%
3.36
0.0009

84
180

Panel B: Breakdown of CEO changes by six month periods
Period

% of newly appointed
CEO with accounting
background

% of CEO appointments
changing from non-accounting
to accounting background

% of CEO appointments
changing from accounting to
non-accounting background

% net changes to
accounting
background CEO

2001: ﬁrst half
2001: second half
2002: ﬁrst half
2002: second half
2003: ﬁrst half
2003: second half
2004: ﬁrst half
2004: second half

11.4%
19.0%
10.0%
59.1%
24.4%
37.1%
35.7%
25.0%

8.6%
19.0%
5.0%
40.9%
14.6%
28.6%
26.2%
22.9%

8.6%
9.5%
0.0%
9.1%
14.6%
11.4%
7.1%
8.3%

0.0%
9.5%
5.0%
31.8%
0.0%
17.1%
19.0%
14.6%

Period in italics (2002: second half) represents immediate post-SOX period.

the passage of the SOX changed board’s preferences for hiring CEOs with accounting/ﬁnancial backgrounds.
To further examine the pattern of CEO changes surrounding the passage of SOX, and to provide some sensitivity analysis, we broke our sample into eight six month
periods, 3 before SOX and 5 after. These results are presented in Table 1, Panel B. The second column displays
the percentage of CEO changes where the new CEO had
accounting/ﬁnance experience. This information is also
presented in graphical form in Fig. 1. As can be seen, this
percentage increases materially in the immediate postSOX period.
The ﬁnal column of Table 1, Panel B incorporates the
functional experience of the previous CEO. This column
represents the net percentage of CEO changes that moved
from a non-accounting CEO to a CEO with accounting
experience. These results suggest that there was a signiﬁcant spike in appointing CEOs with accounting/ﬁnance
experience, and the likelihood of choosing a CEO with an

accounting/ﬁnance background settled down after 2002,
but at a level higher than in the pre-SOX period.
Our logistic regression models are presented in Table 2.
Overall, both models are signiﬁcant at conventional levels
(p 6 0.004). Consistent with the results shown in Table 1,
the ‘‘Post-SOX’’ variable is signiﬁcant and in the expected
direction. The positive sign and signiﬁcance of the ‘‘PostSOX’’ variable indicates that ﬁrms were more likely to select a CEO with accounting/ﬁnance experience in the
post-Sarbanes period than they were in the pre-Sarbanes
period. This further supports the idea that the results seen
in the post-SOX period are not related to the nature of the
companies making the change, but are more likely to be related to changing CEO experience preferences in the postSOX period.
With regard to control variables, gross proﬁt margin
was signiﬁcant at 0.001, indicating that ﬁrms with lower
gross margins were more likely to choose a CEO with an
accounting/ﬁnance background. Long term debt to capital

Fig. 1. Percentage of newly-appointed CEO with accounting/ﬁnance background by six-month periods surrounding passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Note:
Sarbanes–Oxley Act passed in July, 2002.
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Table 2
Logistic regression results. Dependent variable: likelihood of hiring a CEO with an accounting/ﬁnance background (CEO ﬁnancial experience).
Model 1

Intercept
Main variable
CEO appointed after Sarbanes–Oxley Act
Control variables
Log of total assets
Retail store
Gross proﬁt margin
Property, plant and equipment/total assets
Long term debt to capital
Cash/total assets
Cash ﬂow/total assets
Foreign operations?
Dividend payments?
Former CEO accounting background?
Wald v2
P > v2
Sample size

Model 2

Estimate

p > v2

Estimate

p > v2

2.799

0.0451

2.727

0.0607

1.173

0.0024

1.064

0.0071

0.129
0.058
0.044
1.018
0.008
0.444
4.409
0.687
0.342

0.3153
0.9520
0.0001
0.0722
0.0392
0.7482
0.0123
0.0572
0.3498

0.130
0.106
0.053
1.203
0.009
1.055
5.792
0.805
0.557
0.355
37.28
0.004
244

0.3355
0.9145
0.0001
0.0545
0.0331
0.5041
0.0062
0.0422
0.1601
0.4181

37.94
0.003
261

Note: Industry dummy variables included in all models.

and cash ﬂow (as a percentage of total assets) were also
both signiﬁcant. These results together suggest that ﬁrms
facing greater ﬁnancial stress are more likely to prefer
CEOs with accounting/ﬁnancial experience. Finally, it appears that ﬁrms with foreign operation are less likely to
choose CEOs with accounting/ﬁnancial experiences.16,17
Limitations
This study is subject to a number of limitations. Among
these is our use of CEO changes among large publicly
traded ﬁrms. The results presented in this paper may not
be generalizable to smaller ﬁrms. Also, our results suggesting that ﬁrms are more likely to hire a CEO with an
accounting/ﬁnance background may have resulted from
differential disclosure of CEO background in the pre- and
post-SOX periods. The biographical information provided
on the chief executives is not necessarily a comprehensive
list of the CEO’s previous experiences. In the post-Sarbanes–Oxley period, ﬁrms may have been more likely to
include in a CEO’s biography information about a newlyappointed CEO’s accounting/ﬁnance background. Our results thus could also be explained by a change in what
companies choose to disclose about their CEO’s background, rather than a change in the CEO’s background itself. Finally, while our results are consistent with the
idea of boards preferring CEOs with accounting/ﬁnancial
experience more in the post-SOX period, our results could
also reﬂect a smaller applicant pool for CEO positions, as
potential CEO candidates without accounting/ﬁnancial
16
In unreported analyses, we also assessed whether the relationships
between any of the control variables and the likelihood of appointing a CEO
with an accounting/ﬁnance background changed from the pre to the post
Sarbanes eras. Using both separate regression analyses for the two periods,
and interaction terms in a single analyses, our results revealed no
signiﬁcant difference between the control variables pre and post Sarbanes,
with the exception of long term debt to assets, which appear to be slightly
more important post SOX than pre-Sox.
17
None of the industry dummy variables were signiﬁcant at the 0.05
level.

experience may be less willing to assume a CEO’s ﬁnancial
reporting responsibilities in the post-SOX period.

Summary and conclusions
We examined whether CEOs appointed in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley period were more likely to have experience in
accounting and/or ﬁnance than before the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act was enacted. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms were signiﬁcantly
more likely to choose a CEO with accounting/ﬁnance experience in the post-SOX era. Our results suggest that the
events of mid 2002, including the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the ﬁnancial misstatements occurring during this time, may have changed corporate
boards’ decision making in their hiring of top executives.
Whether such a behavioral change will prove cost beneﬁcial to organizations and/or their shareholders has not
yet been established. Such a determination would depend
on whether the beneﬁts of the CEO’s accounting/ﬁnance
knowledge, such as more conservative ﬁnancial reporting
(Matsunaga & Yeung, 2008), would exceed the potential
cost associated with CEO’s more limited knowledge in
other areas.
Our ﬁndings are also consistent with by Hu’s (2006)
idea that ‘‘A board vigorously monitoring . . . performance’’
might conclude that an executive without adequate
accounting/ﬁnancial knowledge ‘‘wasn’t qualiﬁed for the
job’’ of CEO. To avoid the adverse effects of future CEOs
potentially claiming ignorance of basic accounting or ﬁnance matters, boards of directors appeared to place greater value on in-depth ﬁnancial knowledge of top executives
in the post-SOX period.
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